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HENRY MANNE AND THE MARKET
MEASURE OF INTELLECTUAL
INFLUENCE
George L Priesit
There is an important difference between intellectual
achievement and intellectual influence. There are many bright and
intelligent people in the world. Most of them, however, generate no
intellectual influence whatsoever. Our common indicia of academic
rank-tenure, named chairs, tributes, and the like-are related to
some base level of intellectual achievement and then, to longevity,
but seldom to actual intellectual influence. Most faculty members
granted tenure have demonstrated some level of achievement. Named
chairs are distributed largely, though not entirely, according to years
of service.
Tributes presented formerly at retirement (since
abolished) and now at death, measure more the professor's
encouragement of his or her students than influence over those the
professor never knew.
The most prominent modem metrics of achievement-such as
the Nobel or Templeton Prizes-prominent because very substantial
monetary awards attend them-seem chiefly awarded on the basis of
originality. Originality is surely not an unfair measure of intellectual
achievement. Indeed, there is substantial merit to it. Other papers in
this Symposium have addressed the unique originality of Manne's
ideas regarding the market for corporate control and the benefits and
functions of insider trading, which are surely of Nobel caliber. Other
participants in this Symposium are also responsible for ideas of great
originality including, among others, Armen Alchian and Harold
Demsetz, easily equal of Nobel merit.
Pure originality, however, is a peculiar standard for intellectual
influence.
Originality does not correspond to influence; most
commonly, the relationship might be reversed. The most legitimately
original ideas are often charitably described as zany. A person
original in all respects would be hospitalized; the truly original would
challenge current categories of mental conditions.
John M. Olin Professor of Law and Economics, Yale Law School.
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Originality is an especially peculiar standard of influence to be
adopted by economists, particularly economists who believe in
markets. (Indeed, it is, perhaps, a form of corruption for the
economics establishment to have embraced the Nobel idea so
completely.) Originality is not highly valued in markets. For
example, Edwin Drake was apparently the first to drill specifically for
petroleum.' But it was certainly Rockefeller and his partners in
Standard'Oil who created the broad market for petroleum products
and influenced the world with its sale.2 Similarly, scientist Hans
Christian Orsted first produced the derived metal aluminum in 1825. 3
But the market for aluminum and the influence of its discovery was
created by Hall and his
associates after founding the Aluminum
4
Corporation of America.
There is, of course, an important difference between measuring
influence with respect to markets for commodities, such as oil and
aluminum, and measuring intellectual influence. In dealing with
commodities, market-creating activity-market influence-can be
measured in dollars, as sales to consumers register precisely
minimum estimates of the value of the commodity, and net profits
measure the benefit of market creation. Thus, Drake, the first oil
driller, died almost in poverty; 5 Rockefeller, not so. There are some
intellectual creations for which these purely market measures
approximate influence. Bill Gates' fortune is an example. On the
whole, however, direct intellectual influence does not necessarily
possess a dollar correlate.
This is hardly surprising. There are well-known appropriability
problems with respect to the market for ideas. This is the purpose of
the patent and copyright laws that, for all their success, extend to and
provide property right protection to only a small range of intellectual
endeavor.
Groups such as the Nobel Committee revert to originality as an
intellectual metric, most plausibly, because originality can be
measured and identified. Intellectual influence in areas that are nonappropriable has no clear and unambiguous measure. In contrast, it is
relatively easy to identify the first person to articulate some idea. It

1 See 19 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRrrrANICA 573 (15th ed.
2

1997).
Indeed, in a remarkable parallel to the Nobel idea, Drake ended his life near poverty but

for a pension from the Pennsylvania State Legislature given to reward his innovation. See 4 THE
NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRI'ITANICA 211 (15th ed. 1997).
3 See I THE NEv ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRrrTANICA 303 (15th
ed. 1997).
4 See id. Again-an interesting parallel-Orsted is remembered today through the Orsted Medal, awarded for outstanding contributions by Danish physical scientists. See 8 THE
NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRrITANICA 1014 (15th ed. 1997).
- See supranote 2.
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does require some undefinable judgment to determine that the idea is
important-this judgment -distinguishes and excludes those originals
whom we describe as crazy. But it is our lack of a metric for
influence that allows the various prize committees to focus on
originality, which has no relation by itself to the benefit to the
citizenry from the idea. True influence is a good definition of benefit.
A market measure of intellectual influence-who caused the
broadest populace to adopt the idea-would require us to revise
several intellectual myths. Should the award for intellectual influence
be given to Charles Darwin or to Herbert Spencer or Thomas Henry
Huxley who popularized Darwin's ideas? 6 Immanuel Kant and John
Locke were surely smart guys, but is their influence more attributable
to Thomas Jefferson or, perhaps, Martin Luther King, Jr.? Jesus is an
important figure, but the spread of Christian influence must surely be
attributed to Saint Paul or, maybe for our modem world, Billy
Graham?
With these examples, let me turn to Henry Manne and law and
economics.
Law and economics is an intellectual movement and the person
most centrally responsible for its influence in a market sense is Henry
Manne.
The origins of law and economics were attended by great
brilliance. Ronald Coase is a brilliant man and, by the originality
standard, Coase's The Problem of Social Cost is a work of high
significance, as recognized by the Nobel Committee. By a market
standard of intellectual influence, however-that is, what work
actually changed people's ideas and ways of thinking-and how
many ideas and ways were changed by this work-it is not clear that
Coase's great article is first. It took roughly a decade for scholars
working in the field to understand Coase's ideas.8 Reviewing this
history, it is not evident that Harold Demsetz's articles explicating,
applying, and expanding Coase were not more important to the
ultimate influence of Coase's underlying ideas.

6

See generally JAMES R. MOORE, THE POST-DARWINIAN CONTROVERSIES: A STUDY OF

THE PROTESTANT STRUGGLE TO COME TO TERMS WITH DARxvIN IN GREAT BRTrAIN AND

AMERICA, 1870-1900 (1979).
7 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960).
8 Indeed, I believe that many prominent law and economics scholars, including my friend
Steven Shavell, continue to misunderstand important parts of Coase's work. See G.L. PRIEST,
INTERNALIZNG COSTS (forthcoming, 1999).
9 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
13 (1972); Harold Demsetz, Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of Rights, 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 223 (1972).
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Similarly, scholars such as Richard Posner and my colleague
Guido Calabresi are figures of transcendent importance to the field.
Although I shall describe a different form of influence in a moment, it
is difficult to identify a continuing influence of Calabresi's ideas in
the modem world. His distinction between property rules and
liability rules remains a dominant way of thinking.l° But the idea is
not clearly "seminal" in the powerful sense, although the idea has
surely generated many articles thereafter--one definition of
"seminal." It is not evident how truly influential the article has been
in affecting the law or the way we understand relationships in the
actual world.
Richard Posner's work comes closer to satisfying a market
measure of influence. Posner is essentially an intellectual
entrepreneur. His most important contribution to law and economics
(though there are so many that this judgment must be a rough one) is
his claim that common law rules are defined in terms of economic
efficiency, which is more an assertion than an idea. There is no
conceptual foundation behind the efficiency-of-the-law claim; that is
why it is better appreciated as an assertion or, perhaps better yet, as an
intellectual project.
Posner's efficiency-of-the-law project, however, had great
intellectual influence-defined even in market terms-because it
electrified the academy by compelling them to learn something about
law and economics. Here, Calabresi had an important role as well.
Calabresi and Posner both had substantial influence over the market
for law and economics through their decade-long debate over the
importance of efficiency as a value. Note, however, that this
influence derives not so much from the originality of any idea or from
its attempted refutation, but from the debate itself. It was the debate
between the Chicagoan and the Yalie, the conservative and the ultraliberal, which had the influence. And that influence derived not from
any idea, but from the debate itself and, especially, from the fact that
both parties embraced the core of economic analysis as a mechanism
for thinking about legal problems; they simply differed in that
embrace in many respects. At heart, what was important in the
Posner-Calabresi debate was the economic analysis that they agreed
upon. Observers could side with one or the other combatant
regarding their differences. To do so convincingly, however, each
observer had to learn the common areas of agreement.

10See, e.g., Symposium, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:A TwentyFive Year Retrospective, 106 YALE LJ. 2083 (1997).

1999]

THE MARKET MEASURE OFINTELLECTUAL INFLUENCE

329

Even accepting this market-based measure of influence of
Demsetz, Calabresi, and Posner, I believe that it is undeniable that
Manne has had the greatest intellectual influence over the field of law
and economics. However helpful Harold Demsetz's articles, however
riveting to many of us the Posner-Calabresi debate, those who paid
careful attention to either could not have numbered more than one
hundred.
In contrast, Manne introduced, popularized, and extended law
and economics to thousands. Manne achieved this influence in three
basic ways: first, his instructional programs of law for economists and
economics for lawyers; second, his programs on various law and
economics topics for judges; third, and to my mind just as important,
the academic conferences that he organized, many supported by the
Liberty Fund. The instructional programs for economists, lawyers,
and judges will be addressed separately. I would like to add a few
words about his academic conferences, the importance of which-in
market terms-has not been sufficiently appreciated.
Prior to Manne's innovation of them, conferences were very rare
in academics, especially in legal academics. Putting aside Manne and
his successors, they remain rare today. It is very common for social
scientists to list conferences attended as a separate category on their
resumes, with two or three entries for even an experienced scholar.
Many of my colleagues at the various law schools at which I taught
had never been invited to a topical conference, attending only the
annual meeting of the trade association (AALS).
Manne's many law and economics conferences created
extraordinary value for law and economics scholars and especially
young law and economics scholars (as I once was). These
conferences both enhanced existing markets and created markets of
their own. Within a law school, again because of the rarity of
academic conferences, it was a distinction to be invited to an
academic conference of this nature; to be asked to deliver a paper was
a special distinction." Thus, attendance at one or more of Henry
Manne's conferences greatly enhanced the positions of law and
economics scholars within existing schools and with other schools to
which they might be recruited. Secondly, Manne's conferences were
markets within themselves. For reasons to be described below,
Manne was able to attract prominent scholars from prominent schools
n There were many subsidiary benefits as well. At one school at which I taught, the Dean
believed that it was such a sufficiently important distinction that he relieved me of the responsibility of attending the AALS Hiring Convention in favor of attending the Manne Conference
though I was Chair of the Appointments Committee. I do not believe that I have ever adequately expressed my gratitude to Henry for this occurrence.
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as attendees. The opportunity for youngsters to meet eminent
scholars of this nature was unparalleled; these figures would
infrequently attend AALS conferences and, if they did, would even
more infrequently enter extended discussions with unknowns from
the provinces.
Henry Manne had many shrewd ideas with respect to creating
this market, and the analogies to Rockefeller or the founders of Alcoa
are not exaggerated.
1) Manne paid the expenses of all attendees. Expense-paid
conferences seem commonplace today (at least to us in the law and
economics community). It is a rarity in other disciplines. At one
school at which I taught, it was necessary to beg the Dean for support
to attend the AALS conference; one year I was refused.
2) Manne secured the attendance of prominent scholars in the
field by paying them honoraria. Again, this was generally unheard of
in the law and inconceivable in fields such as history or the social
sciences.
3) Manne conducted these conferences in luxury resorts. This
feature was adopted solely to expand the market for law and
economics. 12 The resort feature, plus the honoraria to the eminents,
made the Manne conferences a very attractive invitation.
4) Finally, Manne paid very careful attention to the content of
the conference and to the approaches and positions of the attendees.
None of the many Manne conferences that I attended were ideological
directly. There was no clear or, to my mind, subterranean agenda.
Nevertheless, while Manne, both in terms of content and attendees,
provided for balance, he did not provide for too much balance. As
befits a clever market-maker, Manne's balance was ingenious.
Commonly, extremely prominent liberal economists would attend-such as Paul Samuelson or Ken Arrow.
Though both are
irrepressible, their positions were often cabined by topics far from
familiar to them. Similarly, Manne would typically invite liberal
economists to teach at his Judges' programs. His faculties uniformly
showed political and ideological balance. But again, Manne was in
charge of the curriculum. A liberal economist teaching supply and
demand is hardly dangerous. A liberal economist becomes dangerous
when addressing how to improve the world with unlimited spending
of other citizens' tax monies. That, Henry Manne would never allow.
Together, Manne's programs for lawyers and economists, for
judges, and his academic conferences had enormous intellectual
12

That these resorts were uniformly near fancy golf courses was coincidence.
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influence. They created markets that vastly enhanced the position of
many of us in the field (including myself). In the aggregate, their
influence in creating, enhancing, and expanding the field of law and
economics is extraordinary and unprecedented.
I believe that, in a truly just world,1 3 awards for intellectual
influence should be given to market-makers. Given the world we are
in, a Nobel laureate for work in the field of law and economics such
as Ronald Coase should rightly share that prize with the persons who
most centrally developed the influence of the Coasian approach:
Harold Demsetz and Henry Manne. If Richard Posner and Guido
Calabresi are awarded the Prize (as is often rumored), they should
share it with the person most responsible for the intellectual influence
of the law and economics field-Henry Manne.
As most students of Henry Manne believe, however, the ideal
world is not defined in terms of abstract justice, but in terms of
effective markets. More particularly, I believe that those who believe
in markets should rebel against the Nobel distinction, 14 and press for a
prize defined in terms of the market measure of intellectual influence.
There is little doubt, for the field of law and economics, who the first
recipient of that prize would be.

13 A concept I have discovered at my current school, not from any Manne conference.
14 It is, perhaps, not surprising that a prize indifferent to market measures derives from

Sweden, a last refuge of market resistance.

